W imieniu Jagiellońskiego Centrum Prawo-Język-Filozofia, Katedry Teorii Prawa oraz Instytutu Filozofii zapraszamy na wykłady Any Escher i Davida Duarte z Uniwersytetu w Lizbonie. Wykłady odbędą się we wtorek 20 listopada o godzinie 17.15 w sali 110 na ulicy Brackiej 12.
Tematyka wykładów będzie następująca:1) Ana Escher – When it is vague what is vague – identifying vagueness abstrakt: What exactly should count as a vague term? The stock examples (soritical terms) in the literature are “heap” and “bald”. Variations of these are “rich”, “tall”, “old” and the like. Color terms (“red” and “blue”) are also commonly indicated as vague. As are so called multidimensional terms like “crowd”, “elegant”, “beautiful”. In the law, “neglect”, “adequate”, “danger” and so on. But even common nouns like “chair”, “goldfish”, “furniture”, “mammal” or “vehicle” are frequently indicated as vague terms. These examples are so multiple and diverse that it would seem almost every word can be vague in some sense. Still, nobody takes Russell´s claim that all language is vague seriously. If one does not endorse the view that all language is vague, how to account for this unclarity as to what is vague? The debate on vagueness is largely shaped by its definition. The notion of borderline case, viewed as an area of uncertainty, seems to be central in vagueness descriptions. This notion is certainly pictorial and useful but not very accurate. Define something (vagueness) using something else (borderline cases) implies that the something else is clearly or accurately defined. This is not the case. The aim here is not to solve sorites or eliminate vagueness, but to provide an accurate description of vagueness (it should be possible to ascertain whether a term is vague) which seems even more indispensable in law where vagueness implies discretion. materiały: prosimy o kontakt na email@example.com 2) David Duarte – Deontic modalities and legal positions
abstrakt: Under a Hohfeldian scheme of correlativity and accepting the premise by which legal positions are merely the outcome of norms, from this it follows that a complete frame of legal positions depends solely on the distinct combinations of the variables connected to norm´s deontic modalities. On such grounds, the main claim is that what we call rights is no more than a formal combination of variables contained within the structure of norms and that current theories of rights encompass dispensable value judgments. Analyzing this regarding primary norms and considering atomistic legal positions on a norm individuation basis, the talk addresses these topics and, particularly, some problems regarding legal positions related to permissions, such as the possible correlativity between a full liberty and a duty of non-interference and whether protected liberties are not instead a cluster of a liberty and a claim right. materiały: prosimy o kontakt na firstname.lastname@example.org